

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW AVILA,

Plaintiff,

v.

FELDER, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:21-cv-01510-JLT-BAM (PC)

ORDER VACATING JULY 2, 2025
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(ECF No. 38)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF
CERTAIN CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS

FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

I. Background

Plaintiff Andrew Avila (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding *pro se* in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On May 16, 2025, the Court screened Plaintiff’s second amended complaint and found that it stated a cognizable claim against Defendant Michael A. Felder for deliberate indifference to medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment, but failed to state any other cognizable claims for relief against any other defendant. (ECF No. 37.) Plaintiff was directed to file a third amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in the Court’s screening order or to notify the Court of his willingness to proceed only on his claim against Defendant Felder for deliberate indifference to medical care, within thirty days. (*Id.*) On July 2, 2025, after Plaintiff failed to respond to the Court’s order, the Court issued findings and a recommendation that this action be

1 dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to obey a Court order and for Plaintiff's failure to
2 prosecute. (ECF No. 38.)

3 On July 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed a "Notice of Agreement to Proceed with Cognizable
4 Claims," which is signed and dated June 1, 2025. (ECF No. 39.) Plaintiff states that in light of
5 the current inaccessibility of documents required to ascertain facts essential for curing the
6 pleading deficiencies, Plaintiff agrees to proceed with the cognizable claims identified by the
7 Court's May 16, 2025 screening order. Plaintiff states that he reserves, or otherwise does not
8 waive, his right to proceed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(i)–(iv), inclusive,
9 and (b)(1), if discovery leads to facts supportive of cognizable claims against additional
10 defendants and/or for additional relief. Plaintiff also asks that the Court notify him of any
11 additional action that may be required of him to advance this action forward. (*Id.*)

12 Based on Plaintiff's filing, it appears Plaintiff's response to the May 16, 2025 screening
13 order crossed in the mail with the Court's July 2, 2025 findings and recommendations.
14 Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to vacate the July 2, 2025 findings and
15 recommendation to dismiss this action for failure to obey a Court order and for failure to
16 prosecute. The Court further issues new findings and recommendations that this case proceed on
17 Plaintiff's second amended complaint and the cognizable claim therein, as discussed below.

18 **II. Screening Requirement**

19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
20 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
21 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous
22 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary
23 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

24 A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
25 pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
26 required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
27 conclusory statements, do not suffice." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing *Bell*
28 *Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as

1 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” *Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*,
2 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

3 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires
4 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable
5 for the misconduct alleged. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); *Moss v. U.S. Secret*
6 *Serv.*, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully
7 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility
8 standard. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); *Moss*, 572 F.3d at 969.

9 **III. Plaintiff’s Allegations**

10 Plaintiff is currently housed at the Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”), in Delano,
11 California, where the events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names as
12 defendants: (1) Michael A. Felder, C.E.O., CCHS at Kern Valley State Prison, and
13 (2) CCHC/Medical Doe(s) Defendant(s).

14 Plaintiff alleges claims for deliberate indifference to medical need in violation of the
15 Eighth Amendment and medical malpractice. In January 2018, Plaintiff underwent a right eye
16 cataract extraction billed as a “simple, fast” procedure that would leave him with “perfect vision.”
17 Shortly after the procedure, Plaintiff began to experience very bad pain and started to go “blind in
18 one eye.” He sought health care services for the deteriorating eye condition from defendant
19 Felder and Does who began to make “everything . . . worse.”

20 In a January 16, 2018 medical appointment after the cataract extraction, medical personnel
21 documented that Plaintiff’s retina had become detached. They also noted that the retina
22 detachment can result in “complete blindness” and that treatment entails surgical intervention and
23 that a surgical consult was on the books. Plaintiff alleges that time was of the essence because the
24 longer a retinal detachment goes untreated, the greater the risk of permanent vision loss and
25 surgery should be within days of diagnosis.

26 Defendants Felder and Doe Defendants failed to respond to Plaintiff’s expressed pain and
27 actual medical needs until 2021, approximately three years later. Plaintiff suffered from
28 untreated, detached retina and his eyesight began to further deteriorate, the pain got worse, and

1 additional preventable complications arose. He developed chronic endophthalmitis, a painful and
2 dangerous inflammatory infection in the eye that can cause vision loss. Endophthalmitis is
3 commonly caused by complication of cataract surgery. When accompanied by vision loss,
4 surgery is generally necessary. Notwithstanding medical personnel's document diagnosis and
5 Plaintiff's deteriorating vision, surgery was not provided until 2021.

6 Other complications arose too. Medical personnel diagnosed Plaintiff with cystoid
7 macular edema, a form of retinal swelling associates with vision loss. They diagnosed him with
8 uveitis, an inflammatory condition that can lead to permanent blindness. They also diagnosed
9 him with epiretinal membrane, a vision distorting wrinkle of the retina.

10 Defendant Felder documented that "surgery correction" would be the "only effective
11 treatment" for Plaintiff's epiretinal membrane condition, Plaintiff was not operated on until 2021.
12 Three years had elapsed since Plaintiff had been diagnosed with a detached retina and at least one
13 year had passed since both the chronic endophthalmitis and epiretinal membrane diagnoses were
14 recorded.

15 Plaintiff repeatedly emphasized his plight to Defendant Felder and medical personnel,
16 explain that the "pain is severe in my right eye" continuous and amplified by "real bad
17 headaches." He notified them that his vision had become so bad that it was effectively gone and
18 could only see light and dark with some shapes. He said he could not see well enough to tend to
19 his personal hygiene or see where he was walking. Plaintiff was only offered non-surgical care
20 such as ointments, pills and over the counter pain medications, despite his complaint and the
21 recognition that surgical intervention as necessary and appropriate.

22 While Plaintiff was losing his eyesight, Defendant Felder was involved with Plaintiff's
23 medical care in two ways. Defendant Felder assumed the role of treating physician even though
24 he is neither licensed to provide medical care nor trained in medicine. Plaintiff's vision did not
25 improve under the care of an administrator trained in business administration and environmental
26 management. Plaintiff communicated his medical needs to Defendant Felder during several face-
27 to-face meetings. Plaintiff described intense pain and near blindness. Defendant Felder merely
28 read Plaintiff's chart and prescribed medication that caused an allergic reaction and further

1 damaged Plaintiff's right eye.

2 Plaintiff had an unfolding emergency and Defendant Felder refused for at least a year to
3 authorize the emergency outpatient care, including the recommended surgical interventions that
4 Plaintiff needed to save his eyesight. Defendant Felder decided that enhanced medical care was
5 not warranted and would not budge even when Plaintiff reminded Defendant Felder that prison
6 policy obligated him to send Plaintiff to the hospital. Defendant Felder was not moved by his
7 own admission that surgery was the only effective treatment and the chart notes that Plaintiff
8 risked complete blindness. Defendant Felder merely instructed medical personnel to "continue to
9 monitor" Plaintiff's condition and that Plaintiff should discuss further with them if the issues still
10 persist.

11 Throughout the slow and prolonged multiyear physical pain and handicap order, Plaintiff
12 experienced desolation and severe depression as his ability to socialize and his experiences in
13 everyday life diminished. He had a loss of his ability to create art and creative expression and
14 connect with family and friends causing him emotional pain and distress. The inability to express
15 his artistic creativity also lead to his inability to generate modest funds for his everyday needs in
16 prison life.

17 As remedies, Plaintiff seek a preliminary injunction for medical appliances and/or
18 accommodations, declaratory relief, and compensatory and punitive damages.

19 **IV. Discussion**

20 Plaintiff's complaint fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, and fails to
21 state a cognizable claim for relief, except as noted below.

22 **A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8**

23 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain "a short and plain
24 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
25 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
26 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678
27 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a
28 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S.

at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. *Id.*; *see also Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556–57.

Although Plaintiff’s complaint is short, it is not a plain statement of his claims. As a basic matter, the complaint does not clearly state what happened, when it happened or who was involved. Plaintiff’s allegations must be based on facts as to what happened and not conclusions. While the second amended complaint identifies the specific claims, the allegations are conclusory as to what happened and who was involved, except for Defendant Felder. For instance, it is unclear which medical Doe Defendant did what actions in violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff merely refers to such medical personnel as Doe or “medical personnel.” Plaintiff must describe what each person did or did not do that violated his rights.

B. Eighth Amendment – Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need

Plaintiff alleges a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

To allege a claim of deliberate indifference, plaintiff must show he had a serious medical need and defendants were deliberately indifferent to that need. A medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” *McGuckin v. Smith*, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by *WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller*, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Indications of a serious medical need include “the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities.” *Id.* at 1059–60. By establishing the existence of a serious medical need, a prisoner satisfies the objective requirement for proving an Eighth Amendment violation. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

Here, Plaintiff alleges a serious medical need. He alleges pain and eye problems which resulted in the loss of vision.

Deliberate indifference is established only where the defendant subjectively “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” *Toguchi v. Chung*, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Deliberate indifference can be established “by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” *Jett v.*

1 *Penner*, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Civil recklessness (failure “to act
2 in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should
3 be known”) is insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511
4 U.S. 825, 836–37 & n.5 (1994) (citations omitted).

5 A difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical personnel—or between
6 medical professionals—regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment is not enough to
7 establish a deliberate indifference claim. *Sanchez v. Vild*, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989);
8 *Toguchi v. Chung*, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, “a complaint that a
9 physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid
10 claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not
11 become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” *Estelle*, 429 U.S. at
12 106. To establish a difference of opinion rising to the level of deliberate indifference, a “plaintiff
13 must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the
14 circumstances.” *Jackson v. McIntosh*, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

15 In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a
16 prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be
17 substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this
18 cause of action.” *Broughton v. Cutter Labs.*, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing *Estelle v.*
19 *Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976)). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish
20 deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. *See Wood v. Housewright*, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334
21 (9th Cir. 1990).

22 Liberally construing the allegations, Plaintiff states a claim for deliberate indifference
23 against Defendant Felder.

24 Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any Doe Defendant medical personnel. Plaintiff
25 alleges he given medication and treatment for his condition, but was not given the surgery he
26 requested and needed. There is not any allegation that any Doe Defendant medical personnel had
27 authority to order surgery or knew that surgery was required. Plaintiff alleges that he complained
28 of his eyesight, but he also alleges he was provided treatment by Doe Defendants medical

1 personnel. A prisoner's mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not support a claim
2 of deliberate indifference. *Sanchez v. Vild*, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).

3 **C. Prison Regulations**

4 Plaintiff alleges violations of various prison regulations for responding to medical
5 emergencies. However, § 1983 only provides a cause of action for the deprivation of federally
6 protected rights. "To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the deprivation of a
7 state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, [s]ection
8 1983 offers no redress." *Sweaney v. Ada Cty., Idaho*, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)
9 (quoting *Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist.*, 90 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1996)); see *Davis v.*
10 *Kissinger*, No. CIV S-04-0878-GEB-DAD-P, 2009 WL 256574, at *12 n. 4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3,
11 2009). Nor is there any liability under § 1983 for violating prison policy. *Cousins v. Lockyer*,
12 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting *Gardner v. Howard*, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir.
13 1997)). *Lipscomb v. Olivas*, No. 1:21-CV-01127 BAM PC, 2021 WL 4318029, at *5 (E.D. Cal.
14 Sept. 23, 2021) (the violation of any state law or regulation that reaches beyond the rights
15 protected by the federal Constitution and/or the violation of any prison regulation, rule or policy
16 does not amount to a cognizable claim under federal law, nor does it amount to any independent
17 cause of action under § 1983). Thus, the violation of any state law or regulation that reaches
18 beyond the rights protected by the federal Constitution and is not cognizable under § 1983.

19 **D. State Law Claim – Medical Malpractice**

20 Plaintiff alleges a medical malpractice claim. The second amended complaint does not
21 allege that Plaintiff complied with the exhaustion requirements of the Government Claims Act
22 ("GCA") as to his pendent state law claim. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 905, 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4,
23 950–950.2. Plaintiff is informed that the California Government Claims Act requires that a tort
24 claim against a public entity or its employees be presented to the California Victim Compensation
25 and Government Claims Board no more than six months after the cause of action accrues. Cal.
26 Gov't Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950–950.2. Presentation of a written claim, and action
27 on or rejection of the claim are conditions precedent to suit. *State v. Super. Ct. of Kings Cty.*
28 (*Bodde*), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1239 (Cal. 2004); *Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist.*, 42 Cal.4th 201,

1 209 (2007).

2 To state a tort claim against a public employee, a plaintiff must allege compliance with the
3 GCA. Cal. Gov't Code § 950.6; *Bodde*, 32 Cal. 4th at 1244. “[F]ailure to allege facts
4 demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement subjects a complaint to general
5 demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.” *Bodde*, 32 Cal.4th at 1239. Because Plaintiff
6 does not affirmatively allege compliance with the GCA, the second amended complaint facially
7 fails to state a tort claim for medical malpractice.

8 **E. Injunctive Relief**

9 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in this action. Federal courts are courts of limited
10 jurisdiction and in considering a request for injunctive relief, the Court is bound by the
11 requirement that as a preliminary matter, it have before it an actual case or controversy. *City of*
12 *Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); *Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for*
13 *Separation of Church and State, Inc.*, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). If the Court does not have an
14 actual case or controversy before it, it has no power to hear the matter in question. *Id.*

15 Further, requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of
16 the Prison Litigation Reform Act [“PLRA”], which requires that the Court find the “relief
17 [sought] is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
18 Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
19 right.” In cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any injunction “must
20 be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires
21 preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C.
22 § 3626(a)(2). Moreover, where, as here, “a plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction
23 that goes beyond maintaining the status quo pendente lite, ‘courts should be extremely cautious’
24 about issuing a preliminary injunction and should not grant such relief unless the facts and law
25 clearly favor the plaintiff.” *Comm. of Cent. Amer. Refugees v. I.N.S.*, 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th
26 Cir. 1986), quoting *Martin v. Int’l Olympic Comm.*, 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984).

27 The injunctive relief Plaintiff is seeking may go beyond what would be allowed under the
28 PLRA as it is not narrowly tailored to address the violations of the rights at issue in this action

1 and is too ambiguous and vague. *Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldridge*, 844 F.2d 668,
 2 674-75 (9th Cir. 1988). Therefore, the Court cannot grant broad requests for relief or requests
 3 based on the possibility of an injury.

4 **F. Declaratory Relief**

5 To the extent Plaintiff's complaint seeks a declaratory judgment, it is unnecessary. "A
 6 declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of
 7 judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest." *Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village*,
 8 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948). "Declaratory relief should be denied when it will neither serve a useful
 9 purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and
 10 afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties." *United States v.*
 11 *Washington*, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985). A declaration that any defendant violated
 12 Plaintiff's rights is unnecessary.

13 **G. Doe Defendants**

14 Plaintiff alleges that Doe "medical personnel" engaged in deliberate indifference to his
 15 medical condition. "As a general rule, the use of 'John Doe' to identify a defendant is not
 16 favored." *Gillespie v. Civiletti*, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff is advised that John
 17 Doe or Jane Doe defendants (i.e., unknown defendants) cannot be served by the United States
 18 Marshal until Plaintiff has identified them as actual individuals and amended his complaint to
 19 substitute names for John Doe or Jane Doe.

20 **V. Order and Recommendation**

21 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that the findings and
 22 recommendations issued on May 16, 2025, (ECF No. 38), are VACATED.

23 Furthermore, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows:

- 24 1. This action proceed on Plaintiff's second amended complaint against Defendant Michael
 25 A. Felder for deliberate indifference to medical care in violation of the Eighth
 26 Amendment; and
- 27 2. All other claims and defendants be dismissed from this action for failure to state a
 28 cognizable claim for relief.

1 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District
2 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within
3 **fourteen (14) days** after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may
4 file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to
5 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” **Objections, if any, shall not exceed**
6 **fifteen (15) pages or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page**
7 **number if already in the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page**
8 **limit may not be considered.** The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the
9 specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual
10 findings” on appeal. *Wilkerson v. Wheeler*, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing *Baxter*
11 *v. Sullivan*, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

12
13 IT IS SO ORDERED.

14 Dated: July 15, 2025

15 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe
16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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